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Summary: On October 3, 2003, the Payment Cards Center of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia sponsored a workshop on identity theft to examine its growing impact
on participants in our payments system.   Avivah Litan, vice president and research
director of financial services for Gartner Inc., led the workshop.  The discussion began
and this paper follows with a broad study of identity theft, at times compared with
traditional payment fraud, and continues with an evaluation of its overall risk to
consumers, merchants, and credit providers. The paper compares the incentives each
such party has to address identity theft in concert with current market response to the
crime.  Finally, the paper concludes by posing several questions for further study.  This
paper supplements material from Litan’s presentation with additional research on the
crime of identity theft.1
Introduction 
In October 2003, the Payment Cards Center held a workshop to examine the growing
problem of fraud associated with identity theft:  the impact on consumers, merchants, and credit
providers and the efforts being made by each party to reduce exposure to such fraudulent activity.
Avivah Litan,
1 vice president and research director of financial services for Gartner Inc.,
2 led the
workshop.  She began the discussion by differentiating fraud associated with identity theft from
the more traditional forms of payment fraud experienced by credit card providers and other
lenders.  Identity theft is in many ways a more pernicious action that can have long-term effects
on consumers and significant financial impact on merchants and lenders.  Since identity theft is a
relatively new phenomenon, our understanding of it and its impact is still evolving.  Nevertheless,
as criminal behavior patterns are identified, early-stage prevention strategies are being developed.
It is becoming increasingly evident that to prevent crimes associated with identity theft and to
support victims of this fraud, ongoing and coordinated effort among the industry, policymakers,
and consumer groups is necessary. 
The comprehensive impact of identity theft is not yet fully understood, but recent studies
highlighting the rapid growth and significant costs associated with the crime have spurred debate
and a search for solutions.  Early discussion around identity theft relied on anecdotal evidence
largely reported by the popular press.  Trade groups and government agencies
3 responded with
                                                
1 Litan has written several articles, published by Gartner, Inc., on identity theft, including “Underreporting
of Identity Theft Rewards the Thieves,” 7/7/03; “Identity Theft Fraud Prevention Solutions Start to
Proliferate,” 7/7/03; “Reduce Identity Theft by Rectifying Too-Easy Credit Issuance,” 9/4/03; and “Study
Shows Financial Firms Need to Act Against Identity Fraud,” 9/23/03.  She has also been quoted by the
Washington Post, American Banker, and Los Angeles Times, among others, on the topic of identity theft.
2 Gartner Inc.’s web site, http://www.gartner.com, states “Gartner, Inc. is a research and advisory firm that
helps more than 10,000 clients leverage technology to achieve business success. Gartner’s businesses
consist of Research, Consulting, Measurement, Events and Executive Programs. Founded in 1979, Gartner
is headquartered in Stamford, Connecticut and has over 3,800 associates, including approximately 1,000
research analysts and consultants, in more than 75 locations worldwide. Fiscal 2002 revenue totaled $888
million.”
3 The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston has published a brochure titled “Identity Theft” and a video titled
“Identity Theft:  Protect Yourself” that list steps consumers can take to protect themselves against identity
theft.  This document can be found at www.bos.frb.org under the section on consumer information.  The
Federal Trade Commission has outlined consumer guidelines on the FTC’s web site in a document titled2
information guides attempting to alert consumers to the risks associated with identity theft and to
offer suggestions as to how best to protect personally identifiable information from identity
thieves.  More recently, the Federal Trade Commission issued a report that attempts to quantify
the costs to individuals and businesses.  This report, titled “Identity Theft Survey Report”
(hereafter, FTC Survey), estimates the cost of identity theft to individuals and businesses to be
$3.8 billion and $32.9 billion, respectively.
4   In her remarks, Litan also cited a Gartner, Inc. study
that provides another set of estimates on the frequency and severity of identity theft that
confirmed the significant and rising costs associated with identity theft.  Litan suggested that the
release of such data highlights a need for market participants to re-calibrate the portfolio fraud
risk assumed to be tied to the crime of identity theft and for policymakers and law enforcement
agencies to continue to increase their focus on this significant and growing problem.  
Motivated by the workshop discussion, this paper begins with a review of recent
legislation defining identity theft as a crime and follows with Litan’s further delineation of
payment fraud and identity theft.  The Internet’s central role in facilitating the growth of fraud is
analyzed in terms of its use by criminals as a means to access and then to fraudulently employ
stolen personal data.  The paper also reviews the scope and financial impact of identity theft and
considers the respective market incentives to address the issue across affected parties,
specifically, consumers, merchants, and credit providers.  The paper concludes with Litan’s
review of current approaches being employed to mitigate and control identity theft and leaves
several questions for further study.  This paper supplements material from the workshop with
                                                                                                                                                
“ID Theft:  When Bad Things Happen to Your Good Name.” This report can be found at
http://www3.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/credit/idtheft.htm#risk.
4 The Federal Trade Commission’s Identity Theft Survey Report was released in September 2003 and is
available at the Federal Trade Commission’s web site at http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft.  The FTC
Survey characterizes three types of identity theft, including the following: “New Accounts and Other
Frauds,” “Misuse of Existing Credit Cards or Card Numbers,” and “Misuse of Existing Non-Credit Card
Accounts or Account Numbers.”  The cost to individuals and businesses referenced in this instance relate
only to the category “New Accounts and Other Frauds.”3
additional research on identity theft and its significance in today’s technologically driven credit
markets.  
The Legislative Codification of Identity Theft
The term “identity theft” was first codified in the Identity Theft and Assumption
Deterrence Act of 1998.
5 This act makes it a “federal crime when someone knowingly transfers or
uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person with the intent to
commit, or to aid or abet, any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of federal law, or that
constitutes a felony under any applicable state or local law.”  Additionally, the act defines a
“means of identification” as “any name or number that may be used, alone, or in conjunction with
any other information, to identify a specific individual.”  Identifying information is noted to be,
among other things, a name, SSN, date of birth, driver’s license or passport number, employer or
taxpayer identification number, or telecommunication identifying information or access device.
Finally, the law directs the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to establish a central complaint
system to receive and refer identity theft complaints to appropriate entities, including law
enforcement agencies and national credit bureaus.
The Definitional Dilemma
The industry and the press often apply the term “identity theft” to various forms of
fraudulent activity, including payment fraud.  In Litan’s view, a tightening of the definition is
necessary to effectively motivate the exchange of relevant information and to promote the policy
dialogue she believes is needed to combat this growing criminal activity.    
Litan defined payment fraud as the misuse of stolen customer account information for
financial gain.  The most common form of payment fraud is credit card fraud in which stolen
                                                
5 The Identity Theft Assumption and Deterrence Act of 1998 can be found on the Federal Trade
Commission’s web site at www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/itada/itadact.htm.4
credit card account data, including, most notably, the credit card number, are employed by
criminals to obtain cash or goods using the victim’s credit accounts.   The victim typically
identifies such fraud when spotting inaccuracies in monthly statement information or as a result
of notification by the financial service provider.
6  According to the FTC Survey, 39 percent of
victims detected credit card fraud in less than one week, and only 8 percent of victims took six
months or more to make the discovery.  This relatively rapid identification allows for prompt
remedial action that generally includes canceling the card to prevent further criminal misuse.  The
important distinction for the purposes of this discussion is that the more common forms of credit
card fraud typically involve only a single account and perhaps a few fraudulent transactions
before the fraud is recognized and the card cancelled.  As we will see in the case of fraud
associated with identity theft, the situation is far more complex.  Fraud losses associated with
identity theft can be significant, involve multiple accounts, remain undetected for much a longer
period, and ultimately result in costly and time-consuming efforts to re-establish the victim’s
credit standing.
Turning to fraud associated with identity theft, Litan defined identity theft as the stealing of
personally identifiable private information and the use of such data to impersonate an individual
in order to establish original credit or hide criminal activities.  (This discussion focuses only on
identity theft perpetrated for the former purpose.)  Again, the distinction made here is that fraud
associated with identity theft relates to the establishment of new accounts as opposed to the theft
of existing account information, as in the case of traditional payment fraud.  Further, Litan made
the point that fraud associated with identity theft may not even include a human victim.
Particularly savvy criminals are able to create synthetic identities that are then used to establish
new credit accounts.  If there is a human victim, identity thieves tie the new credit accounts, such
as cellular phone service, credit cards, and short-term loans, to address and contact information
                                                
6 Financial services companies and technology providers have developed sophisticated fraud-detection
systems that monitor credit card use and flag unusual account behavior.  These allow pre-emptive action,5
different from that of the victim. Thus, the thief is able to successfully transfer the point of
contact with creditors and, in this way, hide the theft from the victim.  Identity theft is generally
discovered by the victim either when the fraudulent account activity registers on the credit report
(and, atypically, the credit report is reviewed by the individual) or more commonly, when the
creditors attempt to collect on delinquent payments.  Litan asserted that most damage is done to
these accounts in the first three months, and unfortunately, victims typically do not recognize the
fraud until much later.  According to the FTC Survey, and in contrast to payment fraud, only 17
percent of victims detected identity theft in less than one week, but notably, 24 percent of victims
took six months or more to make the discovery.  
During the longer discovery period associated with identity theft, the fraudulently created
accounts are systematically exploited, leaving the unsuspecting creditors and merchants with
often sizable losses.  The industry uses the term “bust-out fraud” to describe this phenomenon,
since criminals will often take considerable time to build multiple account relationships before
“busting-out.”  As will be discussed later in greater detail, the FTC Survey indicated that when
compared with traditional payment fraud, identity theft represented more than two times the cost
to businesses and more than three times the cost to victims – all of which suggests the problem is
significant and lacking many of the detection tools and preventative measures that have been
developed to combat traditional payment fraud. 
Methods Used to Steal Private Identification and Account Data
The perpetration of payment fraud and identity theft begins with the stealing of
individually identifiable private data accessed by thieves using various means, including the
Internet.  Litan noted that it has proved relatively easy for hackers to access private and sensitive
information stored on some servers via the Internet.  Further, there seems to be a developing
international sub-culture of technically advanced criminal elements sharing pieces of stolen
                                                                                                                                                
such as calling customers to confirm purchase activity and address possible fraudulent account activity.  6
personal information, including, most prominently, credit card data, over the Internet.  These
criminal gangs are loosely organized and use the stolen data to launch concerted fraud attacks.
Litan stressed that even though international fraud sources currently appear to be highly
concentrated, with the industry identifying Indonesia, Russia, and Nigeria as some of the
particularly problematic areas, they are also very mobile and difficult to pin down, making
detection and prosecution especially difficult.  
At the same time, Litan emphasized that fraud, and identity theft in particular, is not
necessarily a high-tech crime.  A review of data provided by victims who believed they knew the
method used to steal their personal information showed that simple techniques were common,
including mail intercepts, lost/stolen wallets or identification cards, and subterfuge by family,
friend, neighbor, or co-worker.  Although the FTC Survey indicated that almost half of victims
did not know how their personal data had been stolen, a significant 26 percent
7 knew the identity
of the person who stole their personal information, and it was often family, friends, or co-
workers. 
The Internet Effect 
In addition to being a means for stealing personal identification data, the Internet also
represents a preferred platform for the perpetration of identity theft as well as traditional payment
fraud.  For the identity thief, the anonymous transactional environment characterized by Internet
commerce provides a real advantage.  The absence of direct physical contact between transacting
parties makes it easier to use stolen personal data to impersonate an individual.  As a simple
illustration, a 50-year-old man could present himself as a 25-year-old woman without detection in
the anonymous online world, whereas such deception would be highly unlikely to occur in the
face-to-face, brick-and-mortar sales environment.  This “cover of anonymity” is relatively unique7
to the Internet
8 and acts to protect criminals from identification, creating special challenges for
law enforcement agencies attempting to arrest and prosecute the perpetrators.  
At the same time, consumers’ use of the Internet to effect commercial transactions continues
to grow at a rapid pace.  Banks and retailers are also increasing their use of the Internet as an
alternative channel for the solicitation of new credit accounts and for the sale of products and
services.  While fraud is reasonably well managed in the mature (flat growth) brick-and-mortar
sales environment, it presents greater challenges in the growing commercial online channel.  In
fact, Litan noted that traditional payment fraud in the brick-and-mortar arena is declining; she
estimated that it is currently less than 0.06 percent of sales.  Alternatively, she stated that in the
online world, associated fraud losses are much higher as a percentage of sales, and notably, these
total losses are growing overall as a result of significant increases in total online sales.  According
to the U.S. Department of Commerce, Internet sales grew at a rate of 25 percent in 2002, reaching
$43.5 billion.
9   Supporting Litan’s view, the results of an online merchant survey released by
CyberSource
10 indicated that credit card payment fraud across participating merchants reached
1.7 percent of online sales in 2003, over 28 times higher than in the brick-and-mortar world.  All
of which supports that payment fraud in the brick-and-mortar environment is a relatively mature
                                                                                                                                                
7 Includes the Federal Trade Commission’s three types of identity theft “New Accounts and Other Frauds,”
“Misuse of Existing Credit Cards or Card Numbers,” and “Misuse of Existing Non-Credit Card Accounts
or Account Numbers.”
8 Also, to a lesser extent, catalogue sales via telephone and direct mail offers are conducted under the same
“cover of anonymity.”
9 U.S. Department of Commerce:  Commerce News “Retail e-Commerce Sales in Second Quarter 2003
Were $12.5 Billion, up 27.8 Percent from Second Quarter 2002, Census Bureau Reports”
10 CyberSource Corporation, “Online Fraud Report – Credit Card Fraud Trends and Merchants’
Response” – 2004 Edition.  The focus areas of this report include the following:  online fraud’s impact on
business, merchants’ efforts to manage fraud, and plans to combat online fraud in the future.  The report
can be obtained by contacting the company or through its web site.  The survey methodology as described
by CyberSource is as follows:  “Merchants who participated in this survey reflect a blend of small-,
medium-, and large-sized businesses based in North America.  They represent companies in their first year
of online sales to the largest e-retailers in the world.  The mix of merchants (by size of online revenues)
who participated in 2003 was nearly identical to those who participated in 2002.  Predictably, however,
participating merchants had more years of experience selling online in 2003.  The survey was conducted
via an online questionnaire at the Mindwave Research website.  Three hundred thirty-three merchants
completed the survey between October 14
th and October 21
st, 2003.  All participants were either responsible
for or influenced decisions regarding risk management in their companies.” 8
phenomenon that is reasonably well managed by credit providers when compared with the newer
and fast-growing Internet world of online transactions.  
To summarize, the Internet is an important and growing commercial channel that, because of
the inherent transactional anonymity, embodies significant systemic risk for fraudulent activity.    
A particular challenge in the Internet transactional environment is the issue of customer
authentication.  Authentication, a critical element in the credit card authorization process, implies
that the merchant has obtained a piece of verifiable private information, in addition to data
available on the card itself, to further validate the identity of the individual making the purchase.
Face-to-face credit card transactions typically present a situation where the card is present, and
therefore, the merchant is able to obtain, relatively easily, additional information to “authenticate”
the individual making the transaction.  In the case of brick-and-mortar sales, for example, the
sales person will cross-check the signature on the back of the credit instrument to that written by
the customer, in person, on the store receipt.  If there remains some doubt, the sales person can
request additional forms of identification, including photo identification, and so forth.  On the
other hand, for commercial transactions that take place over the Internet (or via telephone), the
card is, by definition, not present, and authentication of the buyer, using today’s technology, is far
more difficult.
 11  Under bank card association rules, such transactions are placed in the
“unauthenticated” category – unless the merchant has adopted the relatively new Verified by Visa
program
12 – because the merchant is unable to obtain further verifiable data to confirm the
customer’s identity.   The Visa and MasterCard fraud liability rules are central to the distinction
between authenticated and unauthenticated transactions.  According to these rules, the credit
                                                
11 In the telephone catalogue sales environment, merchants can use the catalogue reference code printed on
the mail order solicitation as a form of authentication. This allows at least some level of assurance that the
person ordering the merchandise is the one to whom the merchant directed the solicitation.  In the Internet
sales arena, buyers come to the merchants’ site with complete anonymity.
12 Verified by Visa represents a security protocol introduced by Visa in 2001.  Merchants who implement
Verified by Visa and request a PIN from a cardholder, which is then validated by participating card issuers,
are not liable for fraud; rather, the card issuer is.  MasterCard has a similar program called MasterCard9
issuer assumes fraud risk associated with authenticated transactions while the merchant assumes
fraud risk associated with unauthenticated transactions.
While merchants await the development and full deployment of Internet-capable and
widespread industry-endorsed authentication technology like Verified by Visa, they are testing
and implementing a variety of tools themselves in an effort to limit losses associated with
unauthenticated online transactions.  The previously referenced CyberSource survey indicated
that merchants were increasing efforts in 2003 to combat online fraud through the implementation
of various preventative measures.  As examples, the following tools were identified in order of
current adoption rates:  Address Verification Service (AVS), manual review, internally built
business rules/decision rules, card verification number (CVN), commercial fraud screen/risk
scoring service, Verified by Visa, commercial fraud screening/risk scoring software, and
MasterCard SecureCode.  Notably, the CyberSource survey estimated that merchants’ use of
manual review has increased significantly – from 52 percent in 2002 to 65 percent in 2003.
Manual review can be a time-intensive and costly process involving, many times, not only further
attention by the merchant’s staff but also additional contact with the customer; therefore, manual
review, although helpful in fraud reduction, adds to the indirect costs of fraud for online
merchants.  While the merchant community is taking important first steps toward preventing
online fraud, in Litan’s view, until such time as authentication technology is ubiquitous and has
buy-in by not only merchants but also credit card providers and consumers, none of these
currently available tools will be able to significantly reduce fraud losses across a wide base of
merchants, especially since only the largest merchants have the resources required to implement
effective fraud prevention solutions and processes.
                                                                                                                                                
SecureCode, but this program only reverses liability from merchants to card issuers when the consumer
actually provides a PIN, not just when a merchant asks for a PIN.10
The Pattern of Identity Theft 
Once thieves have stolen personal data and set out to commit identity theft, as opposed to
traditional payment fraud, they tend to follow a typical pattern to build validity into a stolen
identity.  Initially, the thief establishes an address that is different from the one used by the victim
and, obviously, accessible by the thief.  Litan noted that criminals often acquire a cellular phone
and use this account as the first step toward building data in a credit bureau file tied to the new
address.   Cell phone service can be contracted on an instant-approval basis in a card-not-present
environment and, therefore, offers a low probability of detection.  At the same time, the thief can
determine whether the stolen identity information will pass the “usability test.”  The next step to
building credit is to establish a bank account with a small amount of money, say about $250, to
continue to deepen the credit file with positive data.  Then, the thief will apply for credit cards
and increase the associated lines in a concerted approach to maximize the “take.”  Sometimes, a
thief will establish other credit under the falsified identity, such as short-term bank loans or even
secured auto loans.  Finally, as previously described, the thieves “bust-out” by fully utilizing the
lines and then abandoning the accounts, leaving the victim, merchants, and credit providers with
the loss and the task of sorting out the fraudulent activity and associated liabilities.
Scope of Identity Theft 
As the criminal pattern of identity theft has emerged, it has raised questions regarding the
impact of identity theft on business and on consumers and, importantly, led to the Federal Trade
Commission Survey Report and Gartner’s independent analysis of this issue.  The research
findings recently released by these two organizations suggest the size of the identity theft problem
is much larger than was assumed using the earlier proxy:  the number of registered complaints in
the FTC Consumer Sentinel complaint system.  In fact, the number of identity theft complaints11
recorded in this system was only slightly more than 160,000 in 2002.
13  In contrast, the newer
FTC Survey and Gartner’s identity theft research produced numbers that are significantly higher:
3.2 million and 7.0 million, respectively.  These studies cover roughly the same period:  mid-
2002 to mid-2003. Litan stated that despite the scale differences represented in the FTC and
Gartner data sets, both studies forcefully demonstrate the apparent past under-estimation of
identity theft.
14  Litan further noted that based on Gartner’s estimates, identity theft crimes
increased 79 percent from 2002 to 2003.  Importantly, Litan noted that identity theft may be an
even greater problem than these studies suggest.  According to a recent report by San Diego-
based ID Analytics,
15 a significant amount of identity theft may be missed because it results from
synthetically created identities where there is no real consumer victim and, therefore, no one to
report the crime.  
Financial Impact of Identity Theft 
The FTC Survey details the financial impact of identity theft, both in terms of
opportunity cost and losses to businesses and individuals.  Opportunity cost is defined as the
forgone work hours or leisure time re-allocated to resolving errors related to identity theft in the
victim’s credit file.  The chart below shows the results of the FTC Survey in terms of dollar losses
                                                
13 The Federal Trade Commission reviewed complaints filed in the Sentinel complaint system in its report
titled “National and State Trends in Fraud and Identity Theft:  January 2002 – December 2002” p. 3.  This
report can be found at http://www.consumer.gov/sentinel/pubs/Top10Fraud_2002.pdf
14 GAO testimony on Identify Fraud:  Prevalence and Links to Alien Illegal Activities, June 25, 2002,
before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security and before the Subcommittee on
Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives.  This
June 2002 testimony also suggests that identity theft may be a larger problem than had been previously
assumed given available documentation.  The testimony also addresses the broader implications of identity
theft in regard to immigration, terrorism, and narcotics trafficking.  
15 A September 23, 2003 ID Analytics press release posted on its web site, www.idanalytics.com, discussed
the “National Report on Identity Fraud,” saying that “the year-long research project leading up to this
report analyzed more than 200 million records, including valid and fraudulent consumer applications for
credit, debit and new accounts, together with the largest collection of cross industry known frauds to date.”
The press release also states that “an overall key finding is that a surprising portion of the identity fraud
perpetrated against businesses is actually without a consumer victim because the fraudulent identity is
fabricated.  In fact, 88.4 percent of identity frauds discovered through the research were not originally
reported as such by businesses due to the criminals’ ability to obfuscate traces of the crime.”12
to businesses and victims as well as average resolution time for the victim.  The data show the
disparity in financial loss and time to both businesses and victims of identity theft versus “misuse
of existing accounts,” or traditional payment fraud.  Most notably, on an aggregate basis, identity
theft losses to businesses are over two times and losses to victims are over three times that
associated with traditional payment fraud.    
IDENTITY THEFT
MISUSE OF EXISTING 
ACCOUNTS*
Loss to Businesses, incl. 
Financial Institutions $32.9 Billion $14.0 Billion
Average Per Victim $10,200 $2,100
Loss to Victims $3.8 Billion $1.1 Billion
Average Per Victim $1,180 $160
Hours Spent by Victim to 
Resolve 60 Hours 15 Hours
Source:  FTC - Identity Theft Survey Report: pp. 6-7
* Includes both credit card and non-credit card existing accounts
The Real Cost of Identity Theft to Consumers, Merchants, and Credit Providers
The financial impact of identity theft and traditional payment fraud, as described above,
is significant on its own, but systemic and other indirect fraud-related costs are also borne by
consumers, merchants, and credit providers.   Consideration of such costs on an integrated basis
adds clarity to the complex nature of the market incentives these parties face in addressing the
issue.  In general, Litan suggested that both consumers and merchants are especially motivated to
reduce fraud associated with identity theft, but they must rely on credit providers, a more
centralized group, to drive the implementation of improved fraud protection strategies or to
develop endorsed authentication technology or both.  In Litan’s view, an important policy13
question is whether industry solutions alone will be enough or will new initiatives be required to
deal with this issue. 
Consumers expect to have limited liability exposure related to financial fraud regardless
of whether it is payment fraud or the more intrusive identity theft.  At the same time, credit
providers are motivated to provide such coverage to encourage these same consumers to apply for
loans and, particularly as it relates to credit cards, to use the credit product.  With respect to
identity theft, consumers’ direct financial liability is ultimately limited, but in reality, victims face
significantly higher overall financial costs.  These costs take several forms, including actual
dollar loss (clean-up cost), credit score deterioration, forgone investment, and sacrificed leisure
time.  Litan suggested that these additional costs are a result of the presumption that the identity
theft victim is “guilty until proven innocent” (i.e., the credit provider does not immediately
assume fraud) as opposed to, for example, the victim of payment fraud, who is considered
“innocent until proven guilty” (i.e., the credit provider immediately assumes fraud).  In terms of
identity theft, the requirement to prove fraud leads to a delay before action can be taken to control
the associated fraud exposure.  This delay is crucial because it provides more time for thieves to
continue the fraud associated with the stolen identity and, hence, increases the total losses
realized by all parties.  This lag in recognition exacerbates the problem of detection, containment,
and prevention of identity theft that, by its very nature, already proves to be an extremely
complex crime.    
The Internet and the absence of ubiquitous authentication technology play a crucial role
in the level of merchants’ assumed risk for fraud.  Specifically, Internet transactions, catalogue
sales via telephone, and mail order transactions are card-not-present and typically unauthenticated
transactions.  As such, card association rules dictate any associated fraud loss be charged back to
the merchant’s account (unless the merchant has implemented Verified by Visa and requested a
Verified by Visa password from the consumer).  In contrast, in the brick-and-mortar world of
card-present, or authenticated, transactions, card association rules tie associated fraud losses to14
the credit issuer.  Again, because the Internet offers the cover of anonymity, it is a preferred
channel for the perpetration of fraud, and as sales via this channel continue to climb, the fraud
risk to merchants is growing disproportionately. Litan also noted that this exposure is skewed
toward merchants in riskier product categories.  But many of the larger, more sophisticated
Internet merchants have invested in proprietary fraud detection technologies in an attempt to
mitigate the risk, and they have had some relative degree of success.
In addition to the direct costs of fraud, Litan noted that merchants also assume indirect
costs for these unauthenticated transactions, over and above those specific to non-payment risk.
Litan estimated that merchants are charged 65 percent more in bank interchange fees for online
transactions.  Further, Litan estimated that merchants turn away 2 percent of valid transactions
because they look suspicious.  Notably, in an effort to reduce internationally originated fraud,
Litan estimated that only 61 percent of merchants currently sell overseas and that 10 percent will
stop doing so each year through 2006.  Overall, she estimated that, on average, merchants are
forgoing up to 10 percent in additional revenue potential via this channel.  Internet merchants’
fraud-related costs are high, and when those costs are combined with growing consumer fears of
identity theft and, generally, of transacting on the Internet, a strong argument can be made that
identity theft may threaten the growth of e-commerce overall.  
From the perspective of the credit card issuer, fraud losses resulting from identity theft
are dealt with the same as any other fraud losses; they are charged to the income statement when
realized.  As noted in the FTC Survey and Gartner’s analysis, these losses are significant and
growing.  The ID Analytics study and its estimate of substantial synthetic identity fraud suggest
the problem is even greater than the industry recognizes.  Identity theft associated with synthetic
identities is generally not captured as fraud, and losses are typically charged to the loan loss
reserve.  In these instances, there is no notification of fraud from a victim, and arrests that might
be tied to the fraud are rarely made, making it difficult for creditors to confirm that the fraud has
occurred.  Industry sources note that a rash of returned payment checks or ACH credits are often15
the only signals that a synthetic identity fraud has been perpetrated and too often these signals
come too late.  All of these factors are focusing industry attention on the problem.  
In terms of traditional payment fraud, the credit card industry has done a good job of
managing and containing payment fraud in the card-present environment, but it has had far less
success in stemming fraud in the card-not-present environment.  Litan suggested this is, in part,
because the charge-back rules reduce the industry’s incentives to do so.  However, this could
change if Verified by Visa gains mass adoption by consumers, giving card issuers a direct
incentive to combat online payment fraud, as they absorb the charge-back and fraud costs under
the Verified by Visa program.  Absent compelling market incentives for the card industry, the
open question is how will ubiquitous online authentication technology, crucial to the
establishment of e-commerce as a channel of choice for both merchants and consumers, be
developed?   
Some industry thinkers recognize that their businesses’ success to date has been due, in
large measure, to their having created a safe and flexible payments environment that consumers
and merchants trust.  Any erosion of this trust could have serious implications for the industry
and threaten the positive gains made in their business models and the evolving electronic
payments system.  In addition to their direct costs, credit providers experience the downstream
effects of the costs to consumers and merchants in the form of reduced confidence in electronic
payments and forgone revenue.  
At the end of the day, any solution to identity theft must consider the costs discussed
herein and needs to promote a balancing of incentives among consumers, merchants, and credit
providers.
The Fight Against Identity Theft
Litan outlined current market responses to identity theft as efforts that fall into one of the
three following categories:  industry initiatives, consumer prevention, and government action. 16
Industry initiatives to date have been concentrated in developing authentication tools around the
application process and, on the back end, instituting better data-sharing practices and streamlining
consumer reporting requirements as it pertains to identity theft.  Consumer prevention relates to
consumer actions that can be taken to safeguard personal data from theft and reduce the impact of
fraud.  Governmental action, probably the broadest category, includes both regulatory and
legislative initiatives as well as law enforcement and penalty determination.
In terms of industry initiatives, Litan reviewed three types of applications that have been
brought to market in an effort to reduce the incidence of identity theft by addressing the
authentication of individuals during the credit application process, i.e., application fraud.   The
first is single-source authentication, which can be either the issuance of an identifying PIN or
code to the customer or the use of “out-of-wallet” data to further verify the customer’s identity.
Litan noted that the risk associated with an identifying PIN or code is that the thief also often
steals this piece of data.  Out-of-wallet databases use credit bureau data and specifically include
information about the customer that typically cannot be discovered by stealing a person’s wallet,
for example, the type of student loans the person is holding.  Credit providers can use such
databases to ask customers more obscure questions on their credit applications that only they
should know.  The difficulty, Litan noted, is that these questions are often obtuse and difficult to
answer even for the valid individual.  Moreover, if, indeed, the thief has stolen this consumer’s
credit report, the thief will probably answer such obscure questions better than the true customer.
The second application type, multiple-source data validation, cross references the self-
provided customer data on the credit application with consumer databases, including driver’s
license numbers, white pages, yellow pages, zip code, social security number ranges, and so forth,
and confirms the consumer’s application responses are correct.  Again, in this case, Litan noted
that if the thief has gained access to the victim’s credit report, he will have all the correct data,
and this type of authentication program will not detect the fraud.  Further, the check of17
application data against the multiple-source authentication database may not be real time and,
therefore, presents a window of opportunity for fraudulent activity even in the case of a red flag.
The authentication tool that Litan believed best able to prevent identity theft is cross-
industry pattern recognition because it works to predict identity theft before it happens.  This tool
brings together tracking data across affected industries, following thieves as they attempt to
establish credit via a typical cross-industry pattern (cell phone service to bank accounts to credit
card accounts to short-term loans).   Litan argued that taking a cross-industry perspective will
better allow the entire credit market to identify fraudulent patterns of behavior that holistically are
recognizable but individually are not.  Litan also stressed that using multiple tools or a layered
approach to fraud detection and identity theft prevention is the preferred strategy and noted that,
already, many banks are taking this approach by implementing a combination of the available
tools and by leveraging a mix of internal databases, external databases, and manual checks.
In addition to application-based authentication efforts, the payment cards and banking
industries have also begun working on an organized and more coordinated basis to establish a
single point of contact for consumers to report identity theft.  Increasing the reporting efficiency
will reduce the financial impact and resolution time experienced by the customer and indeed by
all affected parties.  Two notable initiatives include the fraud alert system provided through the
credit reporting agencies and, more recently, the proposal for an Identity Theft Assistance Center
by the Financial Services Roundtable and BITS.
 16  The fraud alert process allows a consumer to
                                                
16 The Financial Services Roundtable’s web site can be found at www.fsround.org.  It describes BITS and
their relationship as “BITS, The Technology Group for The Financial Services Roundtable, was formed by
the CEOs of the largest bank-holding institutions in the United States as the strategic "brain trust" for the
financial services industry in the e-commerce arena. BITS' activities are driven by the CEOs and their
appointees–CTOs, CIOs, Vice Chairmen and Executive Vice Presidents–who make up the BITS Advisory
Group and BITS Council. These leaders identify the issues, develop strategic recommendations and
implement the CEOs' decisions. BITS also facilitates cooperation between the financial services industry
and other sectors of the nation’s critical infrastructure, government organizations, technology providers and
third-party service providers.”  BITS’ web site, www.bitsinfo.org, defines the organization as “a nonprofit
industry consortium of the 100 largest financial institutions in the United States. Serving as the strategic
“brain trust” for the industry, BITS focuses on issues related to e-commerce, payments and emerging
technologies.  Created in 1996 by industry leaders, BITS acts quickly to address problems and galvanize
the industry to advance the interests of its members. BITS’ activities are driven by the CEOs and their18
place a single call to one of the top three credit bureaus and to have an alert put on his or her
credit file at each of the three.  In this manner, the alert process is centralized, more immediate,
and less time consuming for the victim.  The fraud alert also pre-establishes a credit approval
process with the victim, requiring direct approval on all new credit applications tied to the
consumer’s credit record, for example, via a telephone call to a pre-specified phone number.
Separately, on October 28, 2003, several financial services companies along with the Financial
Services Roundtable and BITS announced the creation of the Identity Theft Assistance Center.
This Center will act as a one-stop shop to allow identity theft victims to report the crime once and
have this Center, at no charge to victims, handle the notification to credit providers at which the
victim believes fraud might have occurred.  The Identity Theft Assistance Center should be
operational by the second quarter of 2004.
 17
Litan’s discussion of consumer protection emphasized that individual consumers can
employ simple practices to safeguard personal data and thereby reduce their exposure to identity
theft.  Litan specifically suggested that consumers keep personal data such as SSN and bank
account numbers in a safe environment at all times, shred such documents prior to disposal, and
provide personal data only with a clear understanding regarding the validity of a request.
18   To
detect fraud as soon as possible, consumers must maintain attentive online monitoring of account
activity and regular checking of credit report data.  Further, Litan noted that victim assistance
groups are a useful resource for consumers on the topic of identity theft, and she specifically
                                                                                                                                                
appointees—CIOs, CTOs, Vice Chairmen and Executive Vice Presidents—who make up the BITS
Executive Committee, BITS Advisory Group and BITS Council. These leaders identify issues, develop
strategic recommendations and implement the CEOs’ decisions. Today BITS’ top issues include
cybersecurity, fraud reduction, identity theft, IT outsourcing, operational risk management and payments
strategies.” 
17 Press release, “New Center to Assist Victims of Identity Theft and Reduce Fraud,” Financial Services
Roundtable, October, 23, 2003.  This press release can be found on the BITS web site at
http://www.bitsinfo.org/nr.html
18 Additional consumer guidelines are available on the FTC web site and are outlined in an FTC document
titled “ID Theft:  When Bad Things Happen to Your Good Name,” found at:
http://www3.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/credit/idtheft.htm#risk19
mentioned the Identity Theft Resource Center
19 as a leading consumer group on this topic.
Finally, Litan made the point that such consumer groups are one way for consumers to organize
and to speak with a centralized consumer “voice” on the topic of identity theft.    
Government action, the third element outlined by Litan, has most recently been
highlighted by efforts in the House of Representatives and the Senate to pass legislation to amend
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).  FCRA, enacted in 1970, established obligations for credit
bureaus, users of credit reports, and organizations that provide information to credit bureaus.
Further, FCRA made the Federal Trade Commission the principal enforcer of these regulations.
20
On December 4, 2003, the FCRA amendment, the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of
2003 (FACT), was signed into law by the President of the United States. 
For the purposes of this paper, following is a general review of the more relevant
provisions related to identity theft that are included in FACT.  The amendment will extend,
permanently, state law preemptions and ensure a national standard as it relates to FCRA
consumer protection provisions but not, as it happens, on a broad basis to identity theft
prevention.
21  Only state law in conflict with FACT’s identity theft provisions would be
preempted.  Still, this provision is important because it provides centralized and uniform
management, in the form of federal legislation, as it relates to the use and protection of consumer
financial information.  The November 21, 2003 press release, “Conferees Reach Agreement on
Landmark Identity Theft Legislation,” by the House Committee on Financial Services,
22 outlined
specific obligations for financial institutions to address identity theft, including the following:
“requiring creditors to take certain precautions before extending credit to consumers who have
                                                
19 The Identity Theft Resource Center is led by Executive Director Linda Foley and can be contacted
through its web site www.idtheftcenter.org.  
20 Robert M. Hunt, “The Development and Regulation of Consumer Credit Reporting in America,” Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Working Paper 02-21, pp. 16-17. 
21 Oscar Marquis, “Who Can Be Held Liable for Identity Theft?” American Banker, November, 18, 2003.
22 The press release by the House Committee on Financial Services, “Conferees Reach Agreement on
Landmark Identity Theft Legislation,” dated November 21, 2003, can be found at:
http://financialservices.house.gov/news.asp20
placed ‘fraud alerts’ in their files; prohibiting merchants from printing more than the last five
digits of a payment card on an electronic receipt; requiring banks to develop policies and
procedures to identify potential instances of identity theft;  requiring financial institutions to
reconcile potentially fraudulent consumer address information; and requiring lenders to disclose
their contact information on consumer reports.”  Additionally, the amendment provides for
individuals to request and receive a free copy of their credit report every year from each of the
three national credit bureaus, for consumers to place “fraud alerts” in their credit reports, and for
consumers to block information related to identity theft from being reported to and by credit
bureaus.  Further, the amendment will result in identity theft victims’ being provided with a
summary of their rights.  This legislation is an important step in establishing policy specific to the
crime of identity theft, generally making it easier for consumers to access and monitor their credit
report data and providing an added level of control over the sharing of such data when identity
theft is suspected.  Alternatively, it is still unclear whether such legislation will act as an effective
criminal deterrent and motivate stakeholders sufficiently to curb identity theft’s impact on our
society and its payments system.  
Conclusion
Identity theft is an escalating and significant fraud problem that not only is acknowledged
by consumers, merchants, and credit providers but also has gained the attention of the regulatory
and policymaking communities.  Consumers are the most materially motivated to protect their
identities, but because of this group’s incumbent decentralization, they find it difficult to affect
policy and practices sufficiently to limit their overall exposure.  Merchants are a similarly
decentralized community, and they depend on payment providers to endorse and employ
appropriate identity authentication technology.  Credit providers, credit reporting agencies, and
processors have the data to best empower consumers with authentication tools and other means to
safely manage their personal data and, in the unfortunate case of fraud, to mitigate the effect of21
identity theft.  Importantly, in the search for a solution to identity theft and like so many other
aspects of network economies, balancing incentives among consumers, merchants, and credit
providers is required to produce the best equilibrium.
23  
Progress is being made in the fight against identity theft, but in Litan’s mind, a number of
questions remain:
-  Will growing fears about identity theft reduce consumer confidence in using electronic
payments?
-  Will lack of authentication affect consumer confidence in the Internet?
-  Will lack of authentication technology lead to alternative online payment products?
-  Does the payments system recognize identity theft early enough in the criminal process to
successfully limit risk?
-  What is the role of merchants in combating identity theft?
-  What role can law enforcement agencies play in deterring this criminal activity?
-  How can the burden of proof be shifted away from identity theft victims?  
-  Are additional regulatory or legislative initiatives required to better align the market
incentives necessary to resolve these challenges?
In conclusion, this paper is intended to support the growing number of industry and
public policy experts focusing attention on these questions.  The analytical studies noted in
the paper serve as first steps in better understanding the issues, but additional research and
dialogue will clearly be required to develop appropriate solutions.  At the end of the day, the
costs to society and threats to efficiency of the payment system should be seen as critical
factors to motivate these efforts.
                                                
23 For an analysis of network economies, see Robert M. Hunt, “An Introduction to the Economics of
Payment Card Networks,” Working Paper 03-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.